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not be disturbed or dispensed with. But, of course, acts of Congress
are to be interpreted by the courts, and the ruling of the court of
highest resort is conclusive on the construction.
Since the whole problem is apparently reduced to the single question of what Congress intended, an inquiry into the reasons leading
to the igio amendment should lead the courts to the opposite result from that which they have reached. Before 191o, the employee
was subject to being put to great inconvenience and expense by having to travel to the district wherein the defendant was resident. Congress thought that this was unjust, and was thereby impelled to pass
the ig9io amendment in an effort to end such oppression. It is submitted that it does our Legislature a great wrong to assign to it an
intention so illogical and inconsistent as to pass a statute that would
greatly accentuate the very kind of evil it was trying to abate.
WIHLIAM M. MARTIN

PROTECTION AGAINST INVASION OF PRIVACY IN COMMUNICATIONS:
THE OLMSTEAD CASE SUSTAINED

Since the very founding of the United States, one of the most important phases of the fight to preserve fundamental civil liberties has
been the effort to protect the people of the nation from over-zealousness on the part of law enforcement agencies in obtaining evidence to
secure convictions for law violations. The whole attempt to afford this
protection has been complicated by the necessity of maintaining the
delicate balance between the assurance to the people of the right of
privacy and the obvious need of securing convictions for offenses
against the law.
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States were included to establish a protection against such violations of civil liberties. The Fourth Amendment,1 more specifically,
affords protection against unreasonable search and seizure, while the
Fifth 2 prohibits the forcing of one to testify against himself. It has been
submitted that a more desirable situation would have resulted if both cases had
been decided the other way.
1

U. S. Const., Amend. IV- "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated,
"
2U. S. Const., Amend. V" "No person
.shall be compelled m any cnmnal
case to be witness against himself.."
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said that the two amendments are closely related and should be read
and interpreted together, for as a rule the unlawful search and seizure
is made with the purpose of forcing one to testify against himself,3 thus
involving both of the amendments. A number of states have felt the
4
need of including similar provisions in their constitutions.
I
In recent years a practice undreamed of by the framers of the Constitution has arisen-the use of wire tapping to obtain evidence. This
practice has elicited storms of protest both from the public and members of Congress. Recently, the President of the United States declared
in a letter to Congressman Thomas Eliot: "The use of wire tapping to
aid law-enforcement officers raises squarely the most delicate problem
in the field of democratic statesmanship. It is more than desirable, it
is necessary that criminals be detected and prosecuted vigilantly as
possible. It is more necessary that the citizens of democracy be protected
in their rights of privacy from unwarranted snooping. As an instrument for oppression of free citizens, I can think of none worse than
indiscriminate wire tapping." 5
'Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633. 6 S. Ct. 524, 534, 29 L. ed. 746 (1886)
where it is said of these amendments: "They throw great light on each other. For the
'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against
lumself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment."
For the persons protected by these amendments, see In re Tn-State Coal and
Coke Co. et al., 253 Fed. 6o5 (W. D. Pa. 1918); United States v. Wong Quong Wong,
94 Fed. 832 (D. Vt. 1899); Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 192o), rev'd on
other grounds, Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922). A more extensive list of cases will be found in U. S. C. A. Constitution, vol. 2 (Supp. 194 i) p.
62.
As to the premises protected, see United States v. McBride, 287 Fed. 214 (S. D.
Ala. 1922), Aff'd., 284 Fed. 416 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1922); United States v. Slusser, 270 Fed.
818 (S. D. Ohio i921). See also U. S. C. A. Constitution vol. 2 (1928) p. 463 and
(Supp. 1941) p. 165.
'For example: Fla. Const. of 1885, Art. I, § 22; Ill. Const. of 187o, Art. II, § 6;
Kan. Const. of 1859, Bill of Rights § 15; Tenn. Const. of 187o, Art. I, § 7; Tex.
Const. of 1876, Art. I, § 9; Va. Const. of 1902, Art. I, § io; W Va. Const. of 1872, Art.
III, § 6; Wis. Const., Art. I, § ii.
5Hearing before Subcommittee No. i. of the Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives, 77th Congress, First Session, on H. R. 2266 and H. R. 3ogg, p.
257. This reference is taken from a letter dated August 18, 1941, sent out by the
Council for Civil Rights, 291 Broadway, New York, N. Y. The purpose of this letter
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However, in 1928, in the case of Olmstead v. United States,6 the
Supreme Court specifically held that wire tapping was not an unlawful search and seizure and hence no violation of the Constitution. In
this case, Olmstead was convicted as the chief participant in a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act, by possessing, transporting and selling intoxicating liquors. A large part of the business
done by the defendants necessitated the use of the telephone. The
information leading to the discovery of the conspiracy was largely obtained by the interception of these phone messages by the use of wire
tapping. However, the wire tapping was done off the-premises used by
the defendants, so that no trespass was committed in the process. The
evidence obtained in this manner was instrumental in securing the
conviction of the defendants.
Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the majority in a five-tofour decision which held that there was neither "search" nor "seizure"
involved. Since there had been no entry into the houses or offices of the
defendants, said the Court, there had been no trespass committed in
the wire tapping process, and in no case has a violation of the Fourth
Amendment been found unless there had been an actual physical
search of the defendant's person or effects or an invasion of his property. 7 Four justices entered vigorous dissents, favoring a broader interpretation of the constitutional safeguards to include protection
against unwarranted intrusions on private conversations.
In order to fill this gap left in the protection of these civil liberties,
Congress, in effect, nullified the Olmstead case by passage of the Communications Act of 1934.8 This Act prohibits anyone who receives or
assists in receiving messages in interstate or foreign commerce, from
was to create interest in the case of United States v. Goldman, see note 16, infra, at
the time when the Supreme Court was about to consider a motion for a rehearing
of the accused's petition for certiorari.
6277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. ed. 944, 66 A. L. R. 376 (1928). Also, Foley v.
United States, 64 F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 5 th, 1933), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 762, 53 S. Ct.
796, 77 L. ed. 1505 (1933); Kerns v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 6o2 (C. C. A. 6th, ig3i).
7It

was said that there was no basis for a charge of violation of the Fifth Amend-

ment except in connection with the alleged search and seizure, because the defendants' conversations were all carried on freely and voluntarily.
848 Stat. iio3, June 19, 1934, c. 652, § 6o5, 47 U. S. C. A. § 6o5 (Supp. 1941).
Chief Justice Taft in the Olmstead decision provided Congress with its cue for this
legislation: "Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by
making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials,
by direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence." 277 U. S.
438, 465-6, 48 S. Ct. 564, 568, 72 L. ed. 944, 66 A. L. R. 376, 384 (1928).
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publishing or divulging the contents of such messages to any person
other than the addressee or his authorized agent. 9
In.enforcing this Act, the Supreme Court in Nardone v. United
States'0 held that its provisions applied to federal agents so as to prevent them from testifying as to the content of messages intercepted by
wire tapping. In the language of the Court, "Taken at face value the
phase 'no person' comprehends federal agents, and the ban on communication to 'any person' bars testimony to the content of an intercepted message."" The Court was not faced with the necessity of overruling the Olmstead case, since it only had to apply the statute to the
OThere seems to be very little, if any, legislative action on the part of the several
states, which is comparable to this federal statute. Illinois has a statute, however,
which protects news dispatches in a similar way. See Ill. Rev. Stat. (1941) C. 134, § 16.
A New York statute makes wire tapping a criminal act. N. Y. Penal law § 1423 (6),
Laws of N. Y. (Thompson, 1939) P. igog. There are a number of statutes prohibiting
employees of telephone companies from divulging the contents of telephone messages: Md. Code Pub. Gen. Laws, Art. 27, § 580; Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1936) tit. i8, §§
2011-2014. In Maryland the courts have been called upon to pass on the admissibility
of evidence obtained by wire tapping, in at least three instances. Hitzelberger v. State,
x74 Md. 152, 197 Atl. 605 (1938) is the most significant of these decisions. A Maryland statute (Code Pub. Gen. Laws, Supp. 1934, Art. 35, § 4A) prohibits the admission, in misdemeanor trials, of evidence procured through illegal search or seizure.
Accused contended that this statute prevented the prosecution from introducing
eviderqce of his telephone conservations which had been overheard by wire tapping.
The Maryland court accepted the Supreme Court's view in the Olmstead case that
wire tapping is not a search or seizure, and therefore held that the statute did not
protect the accused. This position was reaffirmed in Hubin v. State, 23 (2d) 706
(Md. 1942). In both the latter case and in Rowan v. State, 175 Md. 547, 3 A. (2d)
753, 134 A. L. R. 615 (1939) it was held that the Federal Communications Act does
not affect the power of state courts to deternmne, in cases tried before them, the admissibility of evidence obtained by wire tapping.
The absence of state legislation in the nature of the Federal Communications
Act takes on great significance when it is remembered that the federal courts permit federal prosecution authorities to use evidence illegally obtained by state officers acting independently and not in collusion with federal officers. Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S.383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (igi4); Edgmon v. United
States, 87 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. ioth, 1936); United States v. Goldstein, 120 F. (2d)
485 (C. C. A. 2d, ig4i).
20302 U. S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. ed. 314 (1937)- On later appeal, 3o8 U. S.
338, 6o S. Ct. 266, 84 L. ed. 307 (1939).
21302 U. S.379, 381, 58 S.Ct. 275, 276, 82 L. ed. 314 (1937). See also United
States v. Polakoff, 112 F. (2d) 888 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S.653, 61
S. Ct. 41, 85 L. ed. 418 (1940) where a telephone message of accused was taken down
by a recording machine attached to an extension phone by government agents. The
court held this to be an "interception," which Judge Learned Hand defined thus:
1 .. anyone intercepts a message to whose intervention as listener the communicants do not consent; the means he employs can have no importance; it is the
breach of privacy that counts." 112 F. (2d) 888, 889. To the same effect, United States
v. Fallon, 12 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
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situation at bar, and did not have to decide the case on the basis of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments as was done in the Olmstead decision.
In Diamond v. United States12 the scope of the Communications Act
was extended by a lower federal court beyond the effect given to it in
the Nardone case. It was held that federal agents could not testify as
to intercepted messages of interstate or intrastate nature. It was reasoned that unless intrastate messages were also covered by the Act, that
privacy which was intended to be made secure would still be threatened. This position was later sustained by the Supreme Court in Weiss
v. United States.1'
This steady tendency toward construing the Act as broadly as
possible seems to have been interrupted in the case of Goldstein v.
United States,1 4 very recently decided by the Supreme Court. By tap2io8 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938). See also Sablowsky v. United States, ioi
F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938). Contra: Valli v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C. C.
A. ist, 1938); Smith v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 556 (App. D. C., 1937).
2 308 U. S. 321 at 327, 6o S. Ct. 269 at 271, 84 L. ed. 298 (1939), rev'g, 1o
3 F. (2d)
348 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). "Plainly the interdiction thus pronounced [by Sec. 6o5 of the
Communications Act] is not limited to interstate or foreign communications. And,
as Congress has power, when necessary for the protection of interstate commerce,
to regulate intrastate transactions, there is no constitutional requirement that the
scope of the statute be limited so as to exclude intrastate communications."
In this case, which has received renewed attention since the decision in Goldstein v. United States, see note 14, infra, the government agents intercepted messages between the various conspirators and transcribed them on phonograph records.
Some of the conspirators were then informed of the interceptions and of the completely incriminating evidence which the government held against them, and by
this means they were induced to become state's witnesses. At the trial these witnesses
testified that they held certain conversations and read some of the intercepted
messages which had been transcribed. The phonograph records and transcribed
notes were admitted in evidence, and some of the records were played to the jury.
The defendants, conspirators who had not confessed, objected to the evidence as a
violation of the Communications Act, and the government countered by claiming
that the Act did not apply because (i) the messages were intrastate, and (2)the
disclosure of the messages were "authorized by the sender," within the words of the
statute, inasmuch as the confessed conspirators had consented to testify for the
prosecution. The Court had no difficulty in overruling both of these contentions,
the first as explained above, and the second by pointing out that the "Act contemplates voluntary consent and not enforced agreement to publication." It was
said that "the interdiction of the statute was intended to prevent such a method of
procuring testimony."
14
io U. S. L. Week 4353, 62 S. Ct. ooo, April 27, 1942, affirming, United States
v. Goldstein, 12o F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), on practically the same reasoning
as was employed by the lower court. This decision was handed down on the same
day as that in Goldman v. United States, see note 16, infra. Mr. Justice Roberts
wrote the opinion for the majority in both cases, but in the Goldstein case Mr.
Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined Mr. Justice Murphy in dissent.
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ping telephone conversations of certain alleged conspirators, federal
officers obtained some strongly incriminating evidence. The officers
then confronted these members of the conspiracy with the fact that
their communications had been intercepted, thereby persuading them
to confess and turn state's evidence. At the prosecution of the other
conspirators, the defendants objected to the admission of the testimony of their confessed colleagues, on the ground that such evidence
was excluded by the Communications Act. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling that the testimony should be admitted,
for the reason that the Act conferred only a personal privilege on the
parties to the conversations intercepted, and since these defendants
were not the senders or receivers of the messages tapped, they were not
protected. This was declared to be the nature of the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment against actual searches and seizures,
and the Communications Act was viewed, as providing the same type
of protection against wire tapping. Also stressed by the Court was the
fact that the testimony of the confessed conspirators at the trial did not
refer to any of the intercepted messages or to their contents. It is not
dear, however, whether this condition was necessary to the decision
reached, for the holding appears to have turned on the other consideration.' 5
Since the Olmstead case has never been overruled, the rule still
stands that wire tapping is not an unlawful search or seizure and not
a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
However, the passage of the Communications Act and its broad application by the courts have served to afford a protection against wire
tapping which, even considering the rule adopted in the Goldstem
case, is at least as broad as that which is given by the Fourth Amendment. To this extent the unsatisfactory consequences of the Olmstead
decision have been overcome.
However, it now appears that neither the Fourth and Fifth Amendments nor the Act of 1934 is adequate to protect the right of persons
"'The Court relied on this fact of the defendants' not being parties to the intercepted conversations, as a means of distinguishing the Weiss case and the Nardone
case. The dissenting justices, Stone, Murphy and Frankfurter, argued that this
factor did not make for a difference in legal result, and that to give it the effect
accorded by the majority was to "defeat or substantially impair the underlying
policy and purpose" of the Act. They further declared that the prohibitions of the
Act and the Fourth Amendment were not the same in scope, and that the majority's
ruling involved "a direct repudiation" of both the Weiss and Nardone cases, so that
the Court must either "ignore or silently overrule" those decisions to maintain its
present holding.
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to enjoy privacy in their communications. The case of United States
v. Goldman,16 which very recently culminated in the Supreme Court's
affirmance of the lower court's decision, presents a situation of novel
incidence in which such civil liberties have been invaded but for
which invasion there is no remedy under the present state of the law. 17
The defendants, attorneys at law, were indicted for a conspiracy
to violate the Bankruptcy Act by receiving, or attempting to obtain,
money for acting, or forbearing to act, in a bankruptcy proceeding.
The facts of the case were exceedingly involved but the interesting
portion concerns the method by which evidence was obtained to be
used against the defendants. Two agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation went to the building where one of the defendants had
his law office, and obtained entrance to defendant's office and to an
adjoining vacant office. Through an opening around a steam pipe
they passed a wire to which they attached a small microphone. This
microphone was then drawn back into the aperture until it was out of
sight. They then departed but later returned to the vacant office to
listen in on a conference between the defendants. Finding that the
microphone would not work because of noises in the steam pipe, the
agents placed a detectaphone against the wall in the vacant office and
thereby listened in on the conversation in the adjoining office. The
detectaphone is a very sensitive device which can pick up sounds
through even a stone wall. Its use requires no wire tapping, and it is
not even necessary that a microphone be "planted" in the room where
the conversation is carried on. At the trial of the defendants, the court
refused to suppress the evidence obtained by the use of the detectaphone. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
this ruling, saying that "no communication by wire or radio was intercepted to make applicable the provisions of sec. 6o5 of the communications act of 1934 ., as construed in Nardone v. United States.
"18 The Supreme Court thereafter denied certiorari in this case, but
'" 118 F. (2d) 3xo (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), aff'd, as Goldman v. United States, April
27, 1942, io U. S. L. Week 4357, 62 S. Ct. 993.

1"One of Justice Brandeis' observations in his dissent in the Olmstead case
seems to embody a prophecy of the occurrence of the Goldman case situation. "But
'time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.' Subtler
and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet." 277 U. S. 438, 473, 48 S. Ct. 564, 570, 72
L. ed. 944, 66 A. L. R. 376, 388 (1928).
21 118 F. (2d) 310, 314 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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that order was vacated on rehearing and certiorari was granted. After
a long delay following the hearing of arguments, the Court announced
its decision affirming the judgment below.' 9 First disposed of was defendant's contention that the part of the intercepted communications
which included remarks of one of the defendants made in a phone conversation with some outside party, was protected by the Communications Act. The Court denied that a communication comes within the
statute's protection at the moment the speaker utters words with the
intention of transmitting them over the telephone. Rather, "the protection intended and afforded by the statute is of the means of communication and not of the secrecy of the conversation." And there was
no "interception" because ". this word indicates the taking or seizure
by the way or before arrival at the destined place." In the broader
issue of whether the use of the detectaphone to overhear the conversations was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court felt that
the Olmstead case controlled and required a negative answer. The
case under consideration was found to be indistinguishable from the
Olmstead case, and the majority of the Court declared itself unwilling
to overrule the precedent decision, but rather expressly accepted the
reasoning therein employed. Thus, though Congress has by positive
legislation protected persons from one form of unauthorized intrusions
on private conversations and messages, there exists no means in the
law to prevent the violation of privacy in communications by other
devices than wire tapping, unless an actual physical search or seizure
II
has taken place.
With the view of protecting the civil liberties here involved how
are the practices of the Goldman case, and similar practices as yet untried, to be met?
Two methods seem possible. One course of action would necessitate the passage by Congress of a new statute to outlaw each specific
"Cert. denied, June 2, 1941, 313 U. S. 588, 61 S. Ct. ixii. Order vacated on rehearing and cert. granted, Oct. 20, 194i, 62 S. Ct. iig, io U. S. Law Week 3129. Case
argued Feb. 5 and 6, 1942. Judgment affirmed, Goldman v. United States, io U. S. L.
Week 4357, 62 S. Ct. 993, April 27, 1942. Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opimon
for the majority. Mr. Justice Murphy dissented and Mr. Justice Jackson took no
part in the decision. Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined
in this separate declaration of opinion: "Had a majority of the Court been willing
at this time to overrule the Olmstead case, we should have been happy to join them.
But as they have declined to do so, and as we think this case is indistinguishable in
principle from Olnstead's, we have no occasion to repeat here the dissenting views
in that case with which we agree." io U. S. L. Week 4358, 62 S. Ct. 996.

278

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. III

practice as it comes to be used. This is actually what happened when
the Supreme Court handed down the decision in the Olmstead case,
and Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934. Such a method
is obviously cumbersome and illogical, and is further unsatisfactory
because there is always present the danger that the legislature may fail
to do its duty upon some occasion. Another objection to this solution
of the problem is that it fails to help the first victim whose rights have
become abridged. True, it would protect against future abuses, but
the person against whom the practice is first employed cannot be restored to his former position.
Another, and far preferable solution to the whole problem is to
change the doctrine laid down by the Olmstead case so that all such
invasions of privacy are violations of the Constitution. This obviously
calls for an overruling of the Olmstead case, but such action, though
made a very remote possibility by the Goldman decision, seems necessary for the adequate protection of privacy of communications. Mr.
Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in that case emphatically
declared that wire tapping is within the scope and purpose of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 20 With this view Justices Holmes,
21
Butler and Stone agreed, adding also short opinions of their own.
Brandeis argued that since the adoption of the Constitution, subtler
and more far-reaching devices have been used to invade the right of
privacy than were contemplated when our fundamental law came into
being. He pointed out the need to include such practices within the
meaning of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and declared that the
Court has never hesitated to construe those provisions in a liberal way.
Such a liberal interpretation was given in Boyd v. United States2 2 when
the Supreme Court held an amendment to the revenue laws unconstitutional as repugnant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the
Constitution. This particular act allowed a federal court, in revenue
2°See dissenting opinion, 277 U. S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. ed. 944, 66 A.
L. R. 376, 391 (1928).
1aJustice Holmes emphasized the contention that, aside from the constitutional

argument, the evidence should have been excluded because it was obtained by a
means which was prohibited by statute in the state where the action took place. He
felt that as a matter of ethics and principle, the government should not use evi-

dence obtained by illegal means. Justice Brandeis also accepted this view as a supplement to the constitutional argument. Justice Stone approved of both grounds for

excluding the evidence, while Justice Butler relied solely on the constitutional
point, believing that procedural rules required the argument on certiorari to be
limited to that consideration.
116 U. S. 616, 6 S Ct. 524, 29 L. ed. 746 (1886).
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cases, upon motion of the government attorney to require a defendant
to produce his private books and papers. It was held unconstitutional
as applied to suits for penalties or in suits to establish a forfeiture of
goods. In the language of the Court, "It is our opinion, therefore, that
a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a
criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in
which a search and seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure."3
Again, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States24 it was held that
the Fourth Amendment protected a corporation from compulsory
production of its books when the information upon which the subpoenas had been framed was obtained by an unconstitutional search
and seizure. In Gouled v. United States25 it was said that an unreasonable search and seizure did not necessarily involve the use of force or
coercion but was committed when any agent of the government in the
guise of friendship or a business call gained admission to the premises
and made a search without the owner's consent. These cases were cited
by Mr. Justice Brandeis in support of his position. By use of this persuasive reasoning, the protection of the Constitution could readily be
extended to combat such pernicious practices of intruding on private
communications as may arise in the future.26 If wire tapping is within
0 116 U. S. 616, 622, 6 S. Ct. 524, 528, 29 L. ed. 746 (1886).
"251 U. S. 385, 40 S. Ct. i82, 64 L. ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426 (190). The defendants
were arrested in their homes. While they were being detained, federal officers went
to their place of business and took all of their books and papers, this being done
with no authority whatsoever. Upon application, the district court directed a return of the papers but it impounded photostats that had been made. Subpoenas to
produce the originals were then issued. These were disobeyed and as a result the
defendants were held in contempt. As has been stated, the Supreme Court held that
defendants were not obliged to produce the papers.
25 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. ed. 647 (192i). "It has been repeatedly decided that these amendments should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by
them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly
overzealous executive officers." 255 U. S. 298, 304, 41 S. Ct. 261, 263, 65 L. ed. 647
(1921).

"It is possible that the Court in the Olmstead case was influenced by the social
conditions prevailing at the time. It will be noted that this case arose under the
prohibition law and it is not inconceivable that the Court, in an effort to enforce
prohibition policies, was persuaded to restrict the application of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments when it would not have done so in more normal times. However,
writers to a large extent seem to approve of the majority opinion of the Court in
the Olmstead case. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940) § 2i84b, pp. 5o, 51-

28o

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. III

the scope of the amendments, then it is only a short step to include
such devices as the detectaphone. It is submitted that the Supreme
Court in deciding the Goldman case has lamentably failed to take advantage of the perfect opportunity to overrule the Olmstead case and
thereby to remedy the unsatisfactory situation which has resulted from
that decision. Justices Stone, Frankfurter and Murphy argued that the
Court should take this step, but the other five justices participating
in the decision were unwilling to overthrow the precedent. Mr. Justice
Murphy's dissent to the ruling of the Court stands as a worthy companion to the famous Brandeis dissent in the Olmstead case, as a plea
for such liberal construction of the Fourth Amendment as would carry
27
out the spirit of the protective provision.
Even without restorting to the drastic action of repudiating its
earlier decision, the Court might have decided that using a detectaphone to overhear communications is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, though wire tapping is not. A possibility of distinguishing the two cases arises from the fact that the use of the detectaphone
is more objectionable than wire tapping, since even the most intimate
conversations can be overheard by its use, whereas in the case of wire
tapping one can perhaps refrain from using the telephone and thereby
protect himself to that extent. In the case of the detectaphone, one
must avoid all spoken communication in order to be assured that his
remarks will not be overheard by others than the addressee. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, failed to perceive any such distinction.
Instead, it emphasized the absence of any trespass upon the person or
property of defendants and the lack of any legal right to privacy from
such intrusions on conversations, and considered these factors to be
2Mr. Justice Murphy conceded that the literal words of the Fourth Amendment do not cover the case involved, because there was no physical entry or search.
"But it has not been the rule or practice of this Court to permit the scope and
operation of broad principles ordained by the Constitution to be restricted, by a
literal reading of its provisions, to those evils and phenomena that were contemporary with its framing. . It is our duty to see that this historic provision receives a
construction sufficiently liberal and elastic to make it serve the needs and manners
of each succeeding generation.
To this end we must give mind not merely to the
exact words of the Amendment but also to its historic purpose, its high political
character, and its modem social and legal implications. . The search of one's home
or office no longer requires physical entry, for science has brought forth far more
effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct and obvious
methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and which inspired
the Fourth Amendment. Surely the spirit motivating the framers of that Amendment would abhor these new devices no less." Goldman v. United States, io U. S. L.
Week 4357, 4359, 62 S. Ct. 993, 997 (1942).
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sufficient to bring the case under the Olmstead decision. It was asserted
that: "Conspirators who discuss their unlawful schemes must take the
risk of being overheard and the risk of having what is overheard used
against them provided there is otherwise no trespass by the listener or
violation of a statutory right to use a means of communication thus
made immune from interception." 28 The Supreme Court approved this
position, branding the argued distinction as"
too nice for practical
application of the Constitutional guarantee.
-129 The possibility of
finding the necessary trespass in the fact that the federal agents had
entered defendant's office to install the microphone was also rejected,
because that device was not actually used to overhear the conversations; and the trespass which occurred in connection with the microphone did not aid in the use of the detectaphone.
III
Even if the scope of the protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is extended and the Olmstead case is overruled, one more problem remains: namely, assuming the evidence to have been illegally obtained, what are to be the consequences? In other words, what steps
are to be taken as a means of enforcing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments?
Two methods of enforcement immediately appear. One .is simply
to make the offending officer liable to criminal prosecution and to
civil liability in favor of the victim. If this method is adopted, there is
nothing that would militate against admission of the evidence for the
purpose for which it was obtained, so long as it is competent in other
respects. This view has found favor in the greater number of the states
and seems to be the rule in England as well. 0 Plainly, the outstanding
"Goldman v. United States, 1i8 F. (2d) 31o, 314 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
"Again Mr. Justice Murphy disagreed: "Whatever may be said of a wiretapping device that permits an outside conversation to be overheard, it can hardly
be doubted that the application of a detectaphone to the walls of a home or a
private office constitutes a direct invasion of the privacy of the occupant, and a
search of his private quarters."
"°An excellent summary of the states following this view will be found in Atkinson, "Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case" (1925) 23 Mich. L. Rev.
748 at 77o . According to Mr. Atkinson's survey, at least seventeen states follow this
view and about an equal number follow it with modifications. Wigmore in his
Treatise on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2183 states as the majority rule: " .. admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the
party has been enabled to obtain the evidence." The statement is sustained by
twenty-five pages of cases cited in its support. The cases come from England as
well as from Canada and more than 3o American states. Mr. Wigmore is strongly
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and primary consideration of the courts adhering to this view is that
the necessity for punishing crime outweighs any danger to civil liberties that threaten as a result of its adoption. Opposed to any advantages of this method of enforcement, are some serious disadvantages.
One great weakness in imposing criminal responsibility lies in the fact
that juries often tend to refuse to convict for such action on the part
of law enforcement agencies. As a practical matter, juries may hesitate
to reprimand an officer in this way, especially if the conviction of the
victim has been obtained. The same consideration is involved in granting a ctvil remedy to the victim, and a further weakness of this process
arises from the fact that officers ate frequently impecunious and thus not
able to pay the damages adjudged against them. A last difficulty is that
the victim of the practice, if convicted, cannot be compensated for his
jail sentence if one has been imposed.
The other method would seem logically to be a more powerful
means of enforcing compliance with the Constitution. This method is
to deny the admissibility of the evidence obtained in contravention of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Such is at present the federal rule.sl
The Weeks case8 2 is the most outstanding and most oft cited case to
this effect. In that case the defendant was arrested by a police officer,
so far as the record shows, without a warrant. Other officers, having
gone to the defendant's house, found the key, and entered and
searched the defendant's room, taking away various papers and articles.
Later in the day, police officers returned to the premises and searched
again, this time carrying away other letters that they discovered. Defendant filed a petition asking for the return of the property so taken,
but the demand was refused. At the trial the papers and letters as well
as some lottery tickets, found by the officers, were put in evidence over
the objection of the defendant. This was assigned as error. The Court,
in deciding in the defendant's favor, placed the higher value on the
right of personal security and liberty and private property. In the

in sympathy with this view, as are a number of law review writers. See: (1926)
Corn. L. Q. 250; (1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 5o9; Note (1931) 17 Va. L. Rev. 593.

i

3Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. ed. 746 (1886); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. ed. 319, 24 A. L. R. 1426
(192o); Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. ed. 647 (1921);
Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 41 S. Ct. a66, 65 L. ed. 654 (1921); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 7o L. ed. 145 (1925); Byars v. United States,
273 U. S. 28, 47 S. Ct. 248, V1 L. ed. 520 (1927); Marron v. United States, 275 U. S.
192, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927).
3Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
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language of the Court, "The tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after
subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of
rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in
the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have
88
a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights."
As a means of enforcing the above mentioned rights the Court refused
to admit the evidence. The primary consideration of this view is the
protection of private rights. The punishment of criminality is secondary.
Of course, the strongest criticism of this attitude is that it hinders
the prosecution of crime, which is obviously a very necessary function
of the government. But in spite of the able criticisms of this view and
of the Weeks case, 4 the position has much merit. Mr. justice Holmes
in his dissent to the Olmstead case said, "We have to choose, and for
my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the Government should play an ignoble part."3 5 It is submitted
that this method of enforcement is the more practical and the more
powerful one. Obviously, it will at once discourage such practices as
wire tapping and the use of the detectaphone, since the evidence obtained in that way is of little use to law enforcement officers. Under
the doctrine of the Weeks case the evidence itself is inadmissible when
obtained in contravention of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. And
the Court has extended this rule further and held that such evidence
cannot be used indirectly. Thus, if by the use of wire tapping or some
analogous illegal practice the officers learn of the existence of other
evidence, that other evidence is also inadmissible. 36 "The essence of
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is
that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all."3 7
232

U. S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).

"Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2184. See also law review articles cited in
note 3o, supra.

W277 U. S.438, 470, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575,

72

L. ed. 944, 66 A. L. R. 376, 386 (1928).

'Nardone v. United States, Po8 U. S. 338, 6o S. Ct. 226, 84 L. ed. 307 (1939);
United States v. Weiss, 34 F. Supp. 99 (S. D. N. Y. 1940), aff'd, io3 F. (2d) 348
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939), rev'd on other grounds, as Weiss v. United States, 3o8 U. S. 321,
60 S.Ct. 269, 84 L.ed. 298 (1939), see note 13, supra.
wSilverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182,
183, 64 L. ed. 319, 24 A. L. R. 1426, 1429 (1920). The Court further said, "If know-
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It appears that the Goldstein decision has somewhat modified the
positive nature of this rule, though to what extent it is difficult to
surmise. Certainly, the Court in that decision countenanced the use
of evidence which was obtained indirectly through an illegal wire tapping. The position adopted indicates that the prohibition of the Communications Act against the indirect use of evidence obtained by wire
tapping is confined to situations in which the conversations of the
defendants themselves were tapped.38 And since the Court regarded
the statute as analogous to the Fourth Amendment as to the nature of
the protection afforded, this same limitation would seem to apply in
cases involving illegal search or seizure. Inasmuch as very many of the
cases in this field involve prosecutions for conspiracies in which several
persons are implicated, the government will probably find numerous
occasions to invoke the shield which is created by the Goldstein decision.
An additional obstacle in the paths of accused persons seeking to
prevent the indirect use of evidence obtained in an illegal manner
lies in the practical difficulty of determining just when the evidence introduced has been obtained by the use of other unlawfully secured
evidence. It is naturally regarded as a burden of the accused to prove
that the evidence sought to be used comes from an illegal source or was
obtained by illegal means.8 9
ledge of them [other facts] is gained from an independent source they may be proved
like any others, but the knowledge gained by the government's own wrong cannot be
used by it in the way proposed." 251 U. S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 183, 64 L. ed.
319, 24 A. L. R. 1426, 1429 (192o).
3Goldstem v. United States, io U. S. L. Week 4353, 62 S. Ct. 1oo0(942). It is
submitted that the majority opinion is unpersuasive on this point, and that, conversely, here the arguments of the dissent are most compelling. This factor seems
to be the basis for the dissent's assertion that the Weiss and Nardone cases are
being repudiated by the majority. See note 15, supra. Undeniably, those decisions
had been regarded as prohibiting indirect as well as direct use of evidence illegally
obtained. And the facts of the Weiss case seem strikingly similar to those of the
Goldstein case. See note 13, supra. The distinction relied on by the majority-that
in the Goldstein case the defendants were not parties to the tapped conversations
while in the previous cases the defendants' own messages were intercepted-admittedly presents a difference of facts; but it is not entirely clear how this difference
bears with direct relevancy on the issue of whether the evidence illegally obtained
as against the parties to the conversations can be indirectly used so as to secure
other evidence against the defendants.
"The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to
the trial court's satisfaction that wire tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that
is established
the trial court must give opportunity
to the accused to prove
that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous
tree." Nardone v. United States, 3o8 U. S. 338, 341, 60 S. Ct. 266, 268, 84 L. ed.
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In the present day when civil liberties are endangered by the stress
of war and there is a consequent need for greater vigilance in their protection, the overruling of the Olmstead case and adoption of the rule
excluding evidence obtained in contravention of the Constitution
would be most desirable.4 0 The fact that the efforts of officers to obtain evidence are for the commendable and vital purpose of law enforcement does not make the infringements on personal rights any the
less dangerous. "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard
to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficient.
Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
EDMUND SCHAEF,
M *
understanding." 41

307 (1940). See United States v. Pillon, 36 F. Supp. 567 (E. D. N. Y. 5941); United

States v. Gruber, 39 F. Supp. 291 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); United States v. Goldstein, 120
F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d, i94i), aff'd., io U. S. L. Week 4353, 62 S. Ct. iooo (1942).
'0"The benefits that accrue from this and other articles of the Bill of Rights
are characteristic of democratic rule. They are among the amenities that distnguish' a free society from one in which the rights and comforts of the individual
are wholly subordinated to the interests of the state. We cherish and uphold them
as necessary and salutary checks on the authority of government. They provide a
standard of official conduct which the courts must enforce. At a time when the
nation is called upoif to give freely of life and treasure to defend and preserve
the institutions of democracy and freedom, we should not permit any of the essentials of freedom to lose vitality through legal interpretations that are restrictive
and inadequate for the period in which we live." Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting
in Goldman v. United States, io U. S. L. Week 4357, 4360, 62 S. Ct. 993, 999 (i942)In reaching its decision, the majority of the Court in the Goldman case may
well have thought it necessary, in view of the current emergency situation, that
the usual civil rights enjoyed in a democracy be curtailed to the extent necessary
to enable the government to render its law enforcement efforts more efficient. This
is mere speculation, however, for no hint of such a reaction is stated in the
majority opinion.
"uMr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438,
479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. ed. 944, 66 A. L. R. 376, 391 (1928).
*WVritten in collaboration with the editors.

